Is the Euro Steeped in Self-Deception and Suicidal Delusion?

After only one day, the Euro Deal of the recent EU Summit began to wilt under the bright heat of the flood lights of rational scrutiny.  On Day 2, we saw a repetition of how the German Constitution is a fundamental stumbling block to a politically united eurozone fiscal union with additional pleadings which could force Bundestag approval of EFSF bond purchases (not the bond purchase program but the actual individual purchases themselves).

We also saw on Day 2 the Erste Group bank of Austria suddenly writedown its CDS portfolio by 1.49 billion euro creating a a 750 million euro shortfall just two weeks after projecting a profit and reducing its 2010 profit 12%.  It reduced its CDS portfolio to 300 million euro yesterday from 5.2 billion euro as of the end of September.  It also announced it was cancelling its repayment of 1.2 billion euro in State aid, while proclaiming it had no intention of requesting new State aid as it would cover the loss with a 35% (only) return of executive bonuses and the use of retained earnings over the next three quarters.  It should be noted that the Erste Group had substantial exposure to Eastern Europe as do Greek bank Subsidiaries in Eastern Europe.

Worse, not only is Sarkozy seeking China's investment in EFSF bonds or the SPV to be created (Van Rompuy is on record from earlier in the year favoring consideration of Chinese investment), but Klaus Regling, the executive director of the EFSF, was not only already talking with the Chinese but even suggesting that EFSF debt could be issued in Yuan.  It is economically incompetent for a sovereign nation with its own fiat currency to issue debt denominated in a foreign currency.  For a monetary union with no fiscal transfer mechanism to issue debt in a foreign currency (Yuan), when its member nations are under credit attack for debt already denominated in a foreign currency (euro), is beyond incompetent; it is economically suicidal.

The surplus countries of the eurozone have the money to invest in the deficit countries; there is no need for foreign investment in eurozone debt which will cause the euro to be sold and dollars purchased by the eurozone countries which will strengthen the euro and make eurozone exports more expensive.  The surplus eurozone countries, in order to economically correct trade imbalances within the eurozone, should be using the current account surplus funds to invest in the infrastructure and manufacturing of the deficit countries. The Euro Deal of this past week has not increased the equity stake of member nations; it only has the member nations providing insurance guarantees. 

The one size fits all approach of the eurozone just does not work.  The deficit countries cannot export and privatize their way into surplus under austerity.  The current account surpluses needed to drive down the existing high private sector leverage and public sector deficit in the deficit countries is too massive (even in Ireland) to be obtained from export growth and the privatization of public assets.

Yet, the mantra of convergence, competitiveness and austerity remain as the key mistakes enshrined as European Monetary Union holy grails carry forwarded from the EMU 1991 currency crisis.  Convergence never happened.  Kantoos Economics, a German economics blog, has had two recent posts which exemplify the group think mindset of the European Monetary Union. One was on competitiveness in which a post by Kash Monsori is used in an attempt to show how misunderstood the European concept of "competitiveness" is and that imposed austerity in the deficit countries is not a self fulfilling economic disaster. The second post on Kantoos Economics is on the "necessary" rigidity of currency unions and internal devaluation as the only method of adjustment for trade imbalances with a currency union.  If Kantoos Economics wants to take on a non-European on competitiveness, then Kantoos would be well advised to take on Rebecca Wilder who has shown the "competitiveness" concept as promulgated in the eurozone is a chimera in which all countries must be like Germany in which the concept has become to mean the efficiency of the economy as a whole involving "...strong macro-prudential policy, infrastructure, efficiency and income gains, savings, etc."  In fact, the concept of competitiveness more generally describes and reflects data from a variety of factors such as education, infrastructures, institutions, technological development, health, macroeconomic environment, market efficiency, labor efficiency, and innovation to name a few.  It is always best when theory adapts to the reality of data rather than morph data to fit a phantasmagorical theory.

When one looks at worker statistics, the Greek worker works longer hours for less money than workers in other EU countries.  However, most Greek workers are involved in agriculture and the worker productivity has a smaller euro value.  For productivity to improve, there needs to be technological improvement within Greece.  In fact if you look at the northern and southern eurozone countries, there is no evidence of profligacy and laziness.  What you will see is, the creation of the euro lead t a massive flow of capital from the northern countries to the southern countries, because it was profitable for the northern countries.  Marshall Auerback and Rob Parenteau have provided a concise and strong economic criticism of the Greek myth of profligacy and the ultimate self-destructive nature of austerity not only on the deficit countries but also on the surplus eurozone countries.  They paint a convincing picture of the need for a more coordinated mutually beneficial growth option involving direct investment by the surplus countries in the infrastructure, technological development, and manufacturing of the deficit countries.

The Australian economist, Bill Mitchell, who has been a long time critic of the euro, sees the Euro Deal as one which solves nothing, continues all of the same problems, intensifies the anti-democratic policies of the eurozone, and increases the pressure on the surplus countries to suffer the same fate as the deficit countries.

What does this leave us with?  Desperation, human suffering, failed nations, a breeding ground for authoritarian regimes, economic collapse?  Or does it leave us with an existential epiphany of NO HOPE and the recognition of a common humanity and purpose that digs down and comes up with the political will to get things done for the best interests of the many and a respect for individual freedom which promotes unbiased, empirical analysis of economic data, the needs of aggregate demand, and recognizes the economic growth power of full employment?

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Euro Deal Euphoria or Wake?

The announcement of a euro deal emerging from the EU Summit on the "debt" crisis yesterday pleased the markets, but it has solved nothing  and appears to have a 100% chance of failure.  In fact the deal only further exposes the the fundamental construction weaknesses and limits of the euro which has doomed it to failure.

How far can you kick a can down the road with a dead cat inside?  Apparently, only one day.  Italian bond yields exceeded 6% at auction today.

Auerback, Wolf, and De Grauwe, among others, have called for the ECB to step up and be a lender of last resort consistent with the role of a central bank.  Unfortunately, the ECB by Treaty construction and ECB rules and establishment is not a real central bank and does not have the independent authority to buy bonds, issue currency (the NCBs issue currency under a rigid ratio per nation with the ECB limited to 8% for clearing purposes), or provide liquidity without difficult collaterization guidelines being met.  The ECB in setting interest rates has shown an inclination to be overly concerned with headline, rather than core, inflation which has caused rates to raised at least one time to far and maintained unchanged rather than lowering rates which has primarily served Germany and France at the expense of the deficit countries.  The ECB can only buy bonds on the secondary market and only of prescribed credit quality.  In its attempts to buy bonds on a limited basis to assist in relieving credit pressure and yields, it has faced significant political opposition from surplus countries which has caused it to act as a Fiscal Enforcer and threaten and/or hold back needed liquidity to NCBs in Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Italy to force national politicians to enact budget cuts and austerity measures despite no public support in those countries.  The role of a real central bank is monetary policy with the ability to provide liquidity, buy bonds, set interest rates, and promote monetary stability as well as act as a clearinghouse.  To get the ECB to act as a real central bank would require Treaty changes and a complete change in the rules and functions of the ECB.  There is not enough time.

Trichet has even recommended a Finance Ministry for the eurozone, but what good would a Finance Ministry have if there is no fiscal transfer mechanism, eurozone taxing authority, and relinquishment of national sovereignty by member countries?  The EU and the eurozone has suffered for too long the determination of sovereign policy in member countries by an elite which is defiant of democratic approval.

Munchau has repeatedly expressed doubts on the leveraging proposed for the EFSF and the SPV which will apparently be created.  Has everyone forgot how disastrous the big banks SPVs were going into the recent Great Financial Crisis?

Sarkozy is promoting the involvement of China when this would only worsen the economic problems as I and Tim Duy have written citing Michael Pettis.

The 50% "voluntary" haircut is not enough and it is unlikely there will be 100% private participation and 1.4 trillion euro EFSF funding is not enough, particularly if European bank's liquidity and recapitalization is eventually challenged.  Additionally, it is popular to overlook the very negative direct effect these haricuts would have on Greek banks if Greece stays in the eurozone.

Many commentators have questioned the jury-rigged euro deal's attempt to structure 50% haricuts as not a defined default triggering CDS.  In fact, in just one day, Fitch has said the 50% haircuts do constitute a default and will affect Greece's credit ratings send the euro down.

The eurozone crisis band aid approach of temporary patches is not sustainable and is just setting the stage for recession and the eternal re-emergence of the very same problems.

Is the eurozone a monetary union with a stable currency benefiting all of its members or is it a tontine in which the last remaining country becomes the Imperial power and the other countries its colonies?  Meanwhile, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, and Spain are being repeatedly raped and France has been moved to the credit rating coming attraction.


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BRICS to the Rescue? Kiss Eurozone Growth Goodbye

In September, when Michael Pettis' private newsletter discussed how destructive a BRICS rescue of the eurozone or any eurozone country by buying bonds would be, his observations and conclusions were too obvious to justify further comment.  Here is a shorter public version of the newsletter.

Bottomline, if China and Brazil were to buy sovereign bonds in the eurozone or EFSF eurobonds (if any are ever approved), it would would mean the eventual shift of financial flows to the BRICS from the eurozone stifling eurozone economic growth, because, as Pettis said, "foreign investment simply replaces domestic savings, undermines the manufacturing sector, and raises unemployment or debt."  As the BRICS bought European bonds, the Europeans would be forced to buy United States bonds, US dollars would be sold to buy euro and the euro would strengthen while trade balances would shift to the BRICS, particularly China.  This is the consequence of foreign investment.  To make matters worse, as Pettis points out, the foreign investment is not needed as Europe is awash  in capital in the surplus countries.

Yet, as the trade surplus nations of the eurozone continue to avoid the trade imbalances within the eurozone, this possible scenario is being floated as the EU Summit  draws out with France and Germany unable to agree and the UK demanding all EU countries participate.  This will only seriously aggravate the eurozone problem as, according to Pettis, "the increase in foreign investment would simply be matched either by an equivalent reduction in domestic savings or an equivalent increase in domestic debt to counteract the rise in unemployment. Rather than ease the burden, in other words, foreign investment simply replaces domestic savings, undermines the manufacturing sector, and raises unemployment or debt."

If the BRICS want to help Europe then they need to invest in infrastructure and manufacturing in the eurozone and, particularly, in the peripheral countries.

If BRICS buy eurozone peripheral sovereign nation bonds through the EFSF or individually, the eurozone can kiss economic growth goodbye and the currency problems of the euro multiply with decreased savings, increased debt, increased unemployment, and loss of trade surplus to non-eurozone countries.

As we indicated in our last post, the eurozone needs to decide if it will be a fiscal European Union or if it needs to break up. 


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Has Germany Castrated the Euro?

The German Bundestag now has the legal authority to require the German government to submit all EU proposals which will have budgetary effect to the Bundestag for approval prior to negotiation committing Germany to any agreement.  This virtually prevents the German executive from negotiating any substantive EFSF or other economic support for the eurozone as a whole, or particular member countries, through the EU, ECB, or EFSF.

Despite early French-German discord, there was some renewed hope that a 3 trillion euro package could be put together for the EFSF only to have the German Finance minister quickly and very publicly state that no miracle cure will emerge from tomorrow's EU Summit on the eurozone's sovereign debt crisis and further stating that the process for resolution will take much longer into next year, which has again placed focus and pressures on bank credit and liquidity rather than the more centrally important issue of sovereign risk in a monetary union without any fiscal transfer mechanism.

The EU Summit tomorrow will not only be a disappointment, but it could well be the ultimate stone thrown on the victim of European union.  The 3 trillion euro package has been reduced to 2 trillion and now they are again talking of 1.3 trillion with no additional public sector haircuts beyond 50%, when it is obvious is needs to be much larger if not 80% or more, at the insistence of the ECB, although that would only amount to a 22% writedown of Greek debt and far too little money to provide bank recapitalization and sovereign credit support.  European banks alone face a potential 7 trillion loan contraction.  A conservative economic stabilization fund would need at least 10 trillion if bond buying to support sovereign credit is included to provide some (this is an off the cuff figure and would only be a temporary solution as the political problems will lengthen the process) time to politically provide either the necessary treaty changes with democratic approval for fiscal union or a planned orderly default and withdrawal of Greece from the eurozone.

Already France is being threatened with a ratings downgrade by Moody's and the S&P is warning of an EMU downgrade blitz.  European officials and economists have lost focus on the big picture in attempts to defend cherished political and economic policies which defy real economic data.  While Munchau has maintained the optimal fix would be a democratic fiscal union with the alternative an unacceptable public recapitalization of European banks, this, in my opinion, would only further the depth of sovereign risk and potentially endanger democratic rule.  Munchau has asserted that the choice will be between fiscal union or break up.  Martin Wolf has essentially agreed in the need for fiscal union as first aid will not remedy the eurozone internal balance of payments crisis which is at the heart of the euro currency crisis, as Michael Pettis has clearly described as an economic imperial and colonial relationship.

The European Commission's assessment report has been leaked which shows the total unsustainability of current program and proposals and further discloses the ECB does not agree with the private sector involvement scenarios.  The full leaked version can be found here.   As Rob Parenteau and Marshall Auerback have asserted in private email communications (of which I was a copied recipient), this document substantially documents not only the unsustainability of current programs but refutes current austerity economic polices as indefensible.  In another private email to them from Martin Wolf, he has indicated that Greece's present problem is one of economic flows, which is correct for the current situation in which Greece's debts are denominated in a foreign currency (euro) and default would gain Greece little.

However, any planned, orderly default by Greece would require an immediate take it or leave it redenomination of all Greek debt, public and private, into the new Greek currency.  This would establish an economic stock in which the economic flows are secondary as a fiat currency sovereign nation which taxes cannot become insolvent. The market would decide the haircuts and devaluation.  Most economic speculation has assumed any Greek default would be within the euro which would be suicidal sacrifice on the alter of European union on the part of the Greece, whose citizens do not appear to want to slink into the darkness of slavery quietly.

The EU Summit tomorrow will not only be a disappointment, it may well be a defining moment of existential despair.  In that despair, what choices will the different people of Europe make?

UPDATE:

Here is a post by Rob Parenteau entitled "Leaked Greek bailout document: Expansionary fiscal consolidation has failed" which can be found at Credit Writedowns here.


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Reducing Unemployment Requires Political Will

In August, I  calculated out monthly job growth, to achieve 5% unemployed for both official unemployment rate and for the total unemployed including discouraged workers, at rates 3-4 times more than we have been experiencing for a year and they still took a significant number of years.

As another example here are two graphs and commentary from macroblog at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta showing three scenarios out through 2017 using three monthly job growth rates consistent with prior months of 96,000, 110,000 (from February 2010), and 158,000 (from August 2003) which show they do not come close to achieving normal 5% unemployment.  In fact, 110,000 monthly jobs growth is approximately almost enough to keep yup with population growth.

I have discussed at least twice that the employment to population ration and the labor workforce participation ratio have been improving slightly while the number of population working or seeking work has declined despite population growth.  We risk seeing these months turning into decades. 

If politicians do not belly up to enact the fiscal programs necessary to get people working now -- not a year or two from now -- and get everyone working, not just a million or 1.3 million, then we are going to see recession (at best), social unrest, and the necessity to remove politicians, who have no political will to protect the public good for all of the people and just a chosen few, in order for those politicians to find another trough from which to feed.

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September 2011 Unemployment 16.5%

While September 2011 official unemployment remained unchanged at 9.1%, total unemployment, including discouraged workers, rose 3 tenths to 16.5%.  If one used the older 1994 method for calculating total unemployed, including discouraged, the number would be closer to approximately 23.2%.

Jobs edged up 103,000, but 45,000 of those were returning Verizon workers who had been on strike.  The private sector gained a net 137,000 while government continued declining by 34,000 according to the September Jobs Report.  This continues to be historically weak.  Wages earnings continued to be weak and average weekly work hours were up slightly.  Involuntary part-time workers increased to 9.27 million from 8.826 million and those unemployed more than 26 weeks increased 6.242 million from 6.034 million despite thousands falling of into statistical nothingness as extended unemployment benefits expire.

While the employment-population ratio increased to 58.3% and the Labor Force Participation Rate increased to 64.2%, both are increasing partially as the result of less people in the work force looking for work as we discussed two months ago.  This chart shows just how dramatically bad it is.


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Michael Pettis on the Euro, Swiss Franc. RMB trading, and Chinese Debt

In a very long private newsletter received on September 13th, Michael Pettis began with "Slow growth is embedding itself solidly into the US economy and the bond mayhem in Europe continues. The external environment for China is getting worse. This will almost certainly make China’s adjustment – when Beijing finally gets serious about it – all the more difficult. With still weak domestic consumption growth, and little chance of this changing any time soon, weaker foreign demand for Chinese exports will cause greater reliance than ever on investment growth to generate GDP growth.

"Europe’s travails in particular can’t be good for exports. What’s worse, it’s now pretty much official that the euro will fail soon enough."  Pettis saw Merkel's assertion that the euro will not fail as an official government denial confirming that it could fail as in the political maxim, "The first rule of politics is never believe anything until it is officially denied."  Pettis then proceeds to discuss in depth Otto Henkel's proposal ( "A Sceptic's Solution - A Breakaway Currency") for a two currency euro.  Although Pettis thinks there is little likelihood of the creation of two euro currencies dividing the deficit and surplus eurozone countries, he likes the idea, because all the deficit countries will not adjust fast enough as long as they maintain the euro and their economies will continue to contract and debt grow until their electorate rebels.  If those countries will then leave the euro and default and the surplus countries will eat the losses, why shouldn't the surplus countries force the deficit countries to leave the euro now?  Pettis answers his own question.

If a deficit euro country leaves the eurozone and adopts its own fiat currency, Pettis believes it would be caught in a downward currency spiral such as Mexico in 1982 and 1994 and Korea in 1997 suffered, because a substantial portion of Mexican and Korean debt was denominated in foreign currency.  A deficit euro country leaving the eurozone would have its debt denominated in euro.  This would be a foreign currency.


My comment in response to Pettis on the above scenarios is the High euro and Low euro bifurcation would merely create to stage productions of the very same play; one with a short and the other a longer audience length of the play.  Both would suffer the same, inevitable fate of the exporting country economically subjugating the importing countries with no fiscal transfer mechanism to resolve the current account imbalances creating an inevitable currency crisis as the deficit countries are challenged by the bond market one by one since they cannot guarantee payment under such a system.  Any eurozone country which withdraws from the euro must default on all euro debt and immediately redenominate all public and private debt at a fixed conversion to the new fiat currency on a take it or leave it basis and then let the new fiat currency trade freely with the market deciding the devaluation, which must occur.  The euro is a foreign currency to all eurozone countries and it would be irresponsible to leave debt in euro when exiting to a fiat currency; yet, almost all scenarios of such exits assume the debt would remain in euro.  That would be a fatal economic error.


As Pettis well knows, as he continues, to leave debt in a foreign currency means the devaluation may well not be in line with estimates of overvaluation.  It could cause a devaluation of 50% or more, when the overestimate might be only 15-20%.  The external debt would rise as its fiat currency devalues, because it would remain denominated in an appreciating foreign currency.  The credibility question of bond payment would rear its ugly head again and financial distress cost would rise just as they are now.  As domestic borrowers try to hedge the currency risk, investors would flee the new fiat currency in a self-defeating currency crisis involving foreign currency debt.  Default would be unavoidable.


For Pettis, this is not an argument for a deficit country to stay in the eurozone, because, if the deficit country "stays in the euro, we will still arrive at default, but much more slowly, and mainly at first through a grinding away of wages and economic growth over many, many years and a gradual building up of debt as Germany refinances Spanish debt at interest rates that exceed GDP growth rates. The default will occur anyway, but only after years of high unemployment."  He leaves unstated the likelihood of growing social unrest and intra eurozone national distrust of the surplus eurozone countries.


This is why he likes Henkel's two euro currency idea, but with the surplus country (such as Germany) leaving the euro as Marshall Auerback has repeatedly suggested.  The new fiat German currency would immediately appreciate while the euro depreciates, but their banks would still have loans in euro which would cause them significant losses.  Pettis thinks the losses would be less and more orderly than a deficit country leaving the euro.  Either way the surplus country leaving the euro would take a big hit and it is a waste of time trying to avoid it and it is better to face it and deal with it and "as any good Minskyite would tell you, that means we have to pay special attention to the balance sheet dynamics."  Pettis also believes this would set up a two entity Europe of Germany and its associated countries and France and its associated countries.

With respect to the Swiss franc, Pettis believes the Swiss National Bank has decided to become very serious about currency wars.  Switzerland is enduring a large inflow of foreign currency and appreciation of the franc with significant negative impact on Swiss exports.  "The world is seriously deficient in demand compared to capacity and every country is going to try (has already tried) to capture as large a share of that demand as it can. This means every country is going to try aggressively to export capital or limit capital imports."

"But of course it doesn’t work that way. If capital-exporting countries want to increase capital exports in order to acquire a bigger share of global demand, and capital-importing countries want to limit or reverse capital imports, something has to give way. This is basically what we mean by trade and currency wars."

Switzerland has chosen to slow or eliminate foreign capital inflow by capping the rise of the franc.  Pettis believes it cannot work and there will be massive speculative inflows in the Swiss franc on the expectation the inflows will cause the Swiss National Bank to revalue.  In a few months the SNB will have to take even more forceful measures.  When countries continue to desperately export capital to each other while continually crying foul at attempts to import capital, currency wars will roll on as he explain in his recent Foreign Policy article. 

This also means we should not get too excited about news London may become an offshore trading center for the Chinese RNB currency.  Every time the suggestion is made that the renminbi will become more international, excitement sweeps the world, although nothing ever really happens.  One only has to look at the developing currency wars and understand everyone wants to export capital and no one wants to import it so why would China want its currency to evolve into a reserve currency by trading internationally.

There has also been speculation that a country like Nigeria would want to diversify reserves and hold renminbi, but Pettis thinks this is only a speculative idea based on the renminbi price being heavily subsidized by the PBoC and, therefore, only likely to appreciate.  China is unlikely to allow any but the financially small countries to attempt this and does not want to see it at all, since "The PBoC is required to buy up all the dollars offered in exchange for RMB in order to keep the value of the currency where it is, and any increased foreign demand for RMB bonds automatically means that the PBoC must take the other side of the trade. Its reserves will have to increase by exactly the amount of dollars that Nigeria (or any other foreigner) uses to buy the RMB. And the faster China’s reserves rise, the greater than domestic monetary mayhem and the greater the losses the PBoC will ultimately take on the negative carry and the revaluation of the RMB."  The short version of his discussion of this in his mid-May newsletter was "...that once you exclude intercompany transactions, nearly all the trade activities denominated in RMB consist of Chinese imports, and almost none of it consists of Chinese exports. Why is this important? Because Chinese imports denominated in RMB result in long RMB positions in Hong Kong, whereas exports result in short RMB positions."  Once the speculative demand dries up, there is little real demand for RNB transactions and the off shore RNB market would be very small.

Speculative demand will begin to dry up when the perceptions on the total amount of debt on the Chinese national balance sheet begin to improve.  However, debt levels continue to rise and rise very rapidly.  Most analysts have downplayed the resulting credit impact of China's spectacular growth.  Such an analysis implies China has an infinite debt capacity, which Pettis finds impossible.  What concerns Pettis now is that as analysts have caught on to this, the "horror" stories have begun to multiply out of control about "...cash flow squeezes among SOEs and the smaller banks, about unrecorded guarantees and lending by SOEs, about highly pro-cyclical lending by banks, about a huge variety of dubious transactions in the informal banking sector, with non-transparent links to the banking sector, and so on and so on. Everyone nowadays seems to have horror stories.  For this reason, Pettis advises we remain skeptical.  We should not scare ourselves into overreacting.  Pettis does not see China reaching its "... debt capacity until one of three things has happened:

1. Depositors flee the banking system because of uncertainty about repayment prospects. I think this is unlikely to happen unless inflation rises sharply and, because of the highly adverse cash flow impact of high nominal rates, the PBoC is unable to raise deposit rates sufficiently.

2. Household transfers are too high. Debt servicing costs should be met out of the increased economic activity generated by the debt. If they aren’t, the balance one way or another must result in a transfer of wealth from one sector of the economy – usually the household sector. As these transfers rise, the ability of that sector to generate growth becomes smaller and smaller. At some point the transfers are too large to be managed, and investment growth must stop. Of course if the government begins to privatize assets and uses the proceeds to clean up the banks and repay loans, this problem need not happen.

3. The private sector becomes so worried about the possibility of financial instability and rising of financial distress costs that they disinvest faster than the government can invest."
   Another way to extend debt capacity limits, according to Pettis, would be similar to Brazil in the mid 1970's when it was "saved" by massive petro-dollar recycling and a subsequent lending boom switching domestic debt to external debt, which allowed Brazil to keep investing and growing until the 1982 crisis and a lost decade.  In principle, China could do this, but it is unlikely to become a net foreign borrower as it would also have to reverse its huge current account surplus into a current account deficit.  He thinks there would institutional impediments preventing this from happening.
   
   
   Everyone knows by now that Chinese inflation is down to 6.2% in August, but he finds these numbers to be so much within expectation that he has nothing to add.  Inflation appears to have peaked, but the numbers require another month or two of observation and Pettis believes the PBoC also believes this.  There is also growing concern among economically literate policymakers about rising debt and weak consumption, because these are basically the same problem.  He expects to see comments back and forth on inflation, but a number of policymakers are reluctant to support more expansionary credit growth as a credit contraction is politically very unlikely.
   Pettis remains concerned that the Chinese consumption imbalance remains a fundamental problem despite Yukon Huang writing in the Wall Street Journal that consumption is in fact far higher than official government figures and takes issue with Huang's interpretation of the studies cited, because one study actually shows 2/3rds of hidden income accruing to the top 10% wealthiest and almost all to the top 50% and, since the wealthy a much smaller share of income than the poor, it would suggest the consumption imbalance is actually much larger.  Pettis also finds the reported size of the imbalance by Huang to be astonishing.  Just because the NBS data is awfully wrong, this would not increase China's invulnerability from crisis.  In the end, all the possible arguments against the dismissal of the fundamental consumption imbalance problem need not be made, because the balance of payments tell us it is extraordinarily low.  "... China doesn’t have either a current account deficit or a balance of zero. It has instead one of the highest current account surpluses ever recorded. This can only happen if the savings rate exceeds by a huge margin the investment rate – which, remember, was itself by 2008 the highest we had ever seen, and which has soared even further in the past few years
   
   
   "By definition, then, China’s savings rate must be extraordinarily high to allow it both a huge investment rate and a huge current account surplus. Since savings is simply the difference between total production and total consumption, China must also have an extraordinarily low level of consumption in order for the balance of payments to balance. I would argue that it almost certainly does."

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Is President Obama's Jobs Stimulus Old, Tired, and Purposefully Inadequate?

Enough time has past since President Obama's $467 billion jobs stimulus announcement to provide a re-evaluation of the proposal from different perspectives.  John Quiggin, writing from Australia, believes President Obama has recognized he cannot form a bipartisan  relationship with the Republican Party and rejected the advice of his advisors and proposed a a more substantial plan, although still modest.  Quiggin believes this has set the re-election stage as the Republican Party will reject even this modest package which is one-half the size of the 2009 stimulus and that President Obama has abandoned the speech of austerity presenting a clear choice against the destruction of austerity on unemployment, economic growth, and local and state governments for voters.  I would very much like to believe Mr. Quiggin is right, but he ignores the President Obama is personally a deficit hawk and has not yet grasped the economic seriousness of the more than 16%, including the discouraged workers, unemployed workers in America.

On the other hand in America, Robert Reich, a former U.S. Secretary of Labor, finds President Obama's targeting of Medicare and crafting a $2-3 trillion decrease in spending over the next ten years as odd given the economy will still be anemic in 2013 if we manage to avoid a double dip.  Such spending cuts are likely to make unemployment stratospheric.  Even if the average monthly job growth of the last decade were to miraculously appear, it would still take until 2024 to get official (now at 9.1%) unemployment down to 6%.  He sees President Obama reinforcing the Republican conceit that the deficit --- not unemployment and little economic growth --- is the problem.  The President failed to propose a more audacious plan to get American workers back to work and provide fiscal support promoting economic growth and this is makes it a failure of both parties.

While President Obama's tax cuts will put about $150 billion into the hands of American households, which could theoretically create a relatively small temporary stimulus, these are not ordinary times and history provides evidence that people save when debt is high, jobs uncertain, and the extra money temporary.  What is there to get excited about if unemployment is reduced just a little below 9%?

Macroeconomic Advisers had revised their original estimates of economic impact to GDP growth of 1 1/4% by 2012 by pulling growth forward from 2013, an increase of 1.3 million jobs (the 2009 ARRA provided about 1.2 million jobs), and the spending cuts will cause fiscal drag which will probably not show up until 2013.  In essence, the plan is dependent on shifting growth from the future (2013) forward, when the economy will hopefully be better.  This is macro economically unrealistic.

James Hamilton wants us to rethink what we need to do to exploit our natural resources to spur economic growth without creating a National Fraud and Exploiters Corps.

Bond Girl at Self-Evident points out that the proposed reduction in itemized interest and other deductions could directly effect the municipal bond market, which is the primary vehicle for infrastructure in this country, through reduced demand.  It should be remembered that the ARRA did provide infrastructure projects which were slow to start, but did have some modest temporary stimulus.

If you look at the Georgia Work Program upon which the President will apparently model the unemployed worker training initiative, you will find that the transition time from unemployment to employment is about the same for both those Georgia workers who participated and did not participate, except that those who participated worked 24 hours a week for free and successful hires got jobs which required a high school diploma or less.  This is not creating the type of fair labor social contract a true republican democracy should promote and support.

It should be remembered that small businesses, even more than large businesses which have a more sustainable business model, cannot afford to hire without the sales to demand the need.  Tax incentives to hire are temporary.  Most small businesses cease existence within 5-7 years.  Many small businesses being started are unemployed workers who have no choice and are being run on shoe string financing.  Tax incentives to hire is an hour glass approach.  Tax incentives may create more accounting jobs, but is not likely on a micro economic level, historically, to create demand to hire.  The sad fact is that, as happened in the post 2001 recession, job postings are not picking up in volume.  Management has devised more efficient ways to not need more employees, particularly in a period of slow economic growth and low sales.  In the meantime, the U.S. working age rate of poverty has hit a record high at 13.7% for 18-64, which is up from 12.9% in 2009 and 10.5% in 1966.  Since its peak in 1999, household median income is down 7% or 3800 2010 dollars.  If the elderly are excluded, household median income is down 10% or $6300, including down 2.6% last year, for the largest decline since 1987.  Real  income for working age families is at its lowest level since 1994.  This is a lost decade for the Middle Class which has intensified the wage and wealth inequality in the United States.  This type of inequality has a very corrosive effect on democracy, particularly when 400 families have 50% of the wealth in the United States.

At the same time the reduction in fiscal spending on the national level during a time of financial tightening is the wrong direction and will only make the situation worse.  Jobless claims are rising again; retail sales are down; manufacturing is weaker.  Rather than focusing on jobs we are told the U.S. Postal Service could "default" on it pension payments required by law, because they are losing money in their operations.  We are told rural areas could lose their post offices when the resulting lack of services would be a significant hardship as they are not suburbanites within easy commuting distance of another post office.  It is a federal government agency and, as such, it cannot economically default unless Congress and the President have politically decided to let it default.  This is misplaced direction.  We need to create jobs not find excused to isolate less wealthy Middle Class and poor families from services.

As we pointed out in our prior post on this subject, for $300 billion all unemployed workers could be back working on quality projects in education, infrastructure, health, social needs, and cultural preservation/creativity which would not only create economic growth but enhance the quality of life through the creation of a National Jobs Corps.  This means more wealth for more people rather than a select few while creating sustainable economic growth.  Is this a problem? 

Dear President Obama would you please accept the mantle of leadership and propose an audacious jobs program.


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Edward Hugh Links: On the Eurozone Crisis

Despite the misplaced hope of the stock markets this past week, the eurozone is headed towards a decision point the leaders of the eurozone do not want to face.  I heavily research the eurozone macroeconomic issues as well as China, because they have global implications.  The eurozone could quite easily unravel with a Greek default within the euro or the need to bailout Spain or Italy.  A currency crisis would ensue and European banks and, quite probably, banks globally could have significant liquidity problems as the interbank market freezes up with the possibility, if nations are not prepared to fund liquidity through their central banks and governments, of some banks failing.

Edward Hugh is an intellectually eclectic British born macroeconomic economist who lives in Barcelona.  Whether one agrees with his conclusions or not, he always has something important worthy of consideration to say.

Here are some observations on eurozone and China PMI showing slower growth.

Ireland is being advertised by the eurozone as a success story to sooth the egos of the newly indentured (to European banks) Irish people.  What is going to happen to Ireland, which is a trade surplus exporting country dependent on exports for its economic recovery, as the global economy continues to slow down?

High Noon is approaching for Greece

Italy has low growth, an aging population, and is the third largest economy in the eurozone.  Can they make the penalty kick?

I have repeatedly stated privately that the breakup of the eurozone into a High euro and a Low euro will only create two stage productions of the same play with different lengths of production and the same tragic ending.  Here is Hugh's take on the subject.

Here he discusses recession risks in Germany.

Here he reviews the recession warning on the eurozone periphery.

Here he covers the flashing red lights for eurozone growth.

Hugh correctly identifies Italy, not Spain, as the elephant in the room.

How can Greece devalue?

Eastern European growth is very dependent on Germany.

Why Spain's economy is more different than you think.

The eurozone crisis is imploding.  If it will not accept a democratic fiscal transfer mechanism the euro is doomed and the international bond markets have recognized this for some time.  The euro is not a fiat currency which can be devalued and as such is a foreign currency, economically, for each and every eurozone country, which means their national debt is denominated in a foreign currency (the euro).  Consequently, no eurozone nation can guarantee its debt.

Being informed on the issues involved requires reading many different viewpoints.  There is a debt crisis, because this is a currency crisis and it could lead to a bank liquidity crisis and potentially to a global depression.

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Michael Pettis Links on Global Outlook, Japan, and the U.S. Dollar

Michael Pettis had a recent  article in Foreign Policy continuing his concern that the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency is a drag on the U.S. economy.

I have not had the time to write about Pettis' last two private newsletters and here are the abbreviated public versions:  On August 17th, he gave his long term outlook for China, the global economy, and the eurozone (very pessimistic) and, on August 25th, he wrote about Japan in which he disagrees with those who would compare the U.S. and Europe to Japan, because Japan's imbalances in the 1990's were different (I, myself, have maintained Japan is like Japan).  You are not getting the full versions, but are getting the full extent of his thinking.

I particularly encourage readers to look at his eurozone assessment/predictions given the current approach to a horizon event in Europe with Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland poised to pull the trigger on Greece and sacrifice Italy (the third largest economy in the eurozone).

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