In my response to Brad Setzer's post on central bank coordination, with which I have no real objection other than his citation of an article which continues the exceptionally false Target2 risks argument which is not even competent economics, I merely pointed out how difficult, and often impractical, it is to get central banks to coordinate given different situations within their country and that the ECB presents an even more difficult problem, because it serves a monetary union without fiscal transfer processes and without a fiat currency. With respect to Lael Brainard's speech on cross
border spillovers, I perceive her analysis of different scenarios in different countries with different or similar situations to be cognizant of the need to not only consider spillover impacts but the need to communicate with other central banks. I think this not only desirable but necessary.
I also observed that monetary policy is only as good as it is supported by the respective government's fiscal policy. If politics is pursuing economically destructive policies, such as austerity and a failure to provide employment, central bank monetary policy will always be impaired.
At the same time we live in an age of increasing financial and cyber warfare. Would it really be desirable for the Fed to communicate with the Venezuelan, North Korean, or Syrian Central Banks? While we should communicate with the Russian and Chinese Central Banks, how much do we dare communicate?
On the other hand if there is large bank crisis, currency crisis, or market free fall, central banks should be communicating and working together worldwide.
Print Page
The Politicization of Social Responsibility
19 hours ago
No comments:
Post a Comment